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Esiste la presenza digitale?

Björn Westberg

A causa della progressiva digitalizzazione di tutti i settori dell’economia, nel BEPS sono state evidenziate le problematiche fiscali di maggiore rilevanza relative all’attività delle società digitali: si configura una presenza digitale massiccia nel­l’economia di ogni singolo paese in assenza di assoggettamento a tassazione; l’at­tività di queste imprese genera valore legato alla creazione di dati rilevanti ai fini della localizzazione dei consumatori, reperiti tramite la fornitura di beni e servizi digitali; la conseguente necessità di assicurare un’efficacie riscossione delle imposte dovute. Inoltre, sono stati realizzati, da parte degli ordinamenti nazionali, diversi tentativi di introdurre delle speciali forme di tassazione sui valori della digital economy. Alla luce di tali esperienze, il Gruppo Europeo degli esperti della digital economy ha ipotizzato che non dovrebbe essere configurato un sistema di tassazione speciale per le imprese digitali. Tale conclusione incontestabile, e tuttavia emergono delle questioni critiche con riferimento alle politiche di lungo termine. I radicali cambiamenti proposti al sistema di tassazione delle società, ipotizzando una tassazione sui flussi finanziari o sui profitti, modificherebbe profondamente il sistema, attuale, collocando la base imponibile nei paesi di destinazione, invece che negli Stati fonte, e la soluzione non appare neutrale. Appare più proficuo il tentativo di applicare rigidamente i rimedi elaborati per contrastare il fenomeno dell’erosione della base imponibile, includendo in una soluzione impositiva sia il fenomeno del consumo che quello della produzione del reddito.

PAROLE CHIAVE: presenza digitale - nesso digitale - erosione della base imponibile - tassazione sul consumo - tassazione sul reddito

Digital presence - Does it exist?

Since the whole economy is becoming digital, BEPS action Plan underlined the most important issues relevant to digital companies action: significant digital presence in the economy of another country without being liable to taxation; value created from the generation of marketable location-relevant data through the use of digital products and services; the need to ensure an effective tax collection. Then, there have been many and different national attempts to introduce special taxation on the Digital Economy. In the light of the experiences, the European Group of Experts has taken that there should not be a special tax regime for digital companies. While the conclusions are uncontested, the critical moment of the Report in respect of Corporate Income Taxation is related to the long term policy options. The proposed radical changes to the corporation tax system, thinking to a corporate tax on cash flows instead or on profit determined on an accrual basis would fundamentally change the current tax system and allocate the tax base to destination countries instead of source countries, but the solution could be not neutral. It would be better to concentrate the efforts on strict applications of remedies against base eroding transactions and include both income and consumption taxation in the new digital income tax solution.

Keywords: digital presence, digital nexus, base erosion, income taxation, consumption taxation

1. Background and Purpose of this Article

Does the present international business taxation reflect a fair sharing of the profits or will it contribute to erosion of the tax bases? For me as a mem­ber of the EU High Level Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy [3] this was a core issue.

The task of the Expert Group has been «to identify improvements in the current way of taxing the digital economy in the EU, weighing up both the benefits and risks of various approaches.

Its focus will be on identifying the key problems with taxing the digital economy from an EU perspective, and presenting a range of possible solutions. The Commission will then develop any necessary EU initiatives to improve the tax framework for the digital sector in Europe, which has the po­tential to contribute significantly to growth and innovation in the EU». The task relates to taxes of all kinds, although taxes related to business activities in a broad meaning as Corporate income taxes as well as Consumption taxes are most important.

This article concentrates on Characteristics of the Digital Economy and Conclusions in respect of Corporate Income Taxes. General matters related to the G20 and OECD project named BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) are only briefly referred, if being of direct importance for the Digital Economy.

2. BEPS

The BEPS Action Plan underlines that «[f]undamental changes are needed to effectively prevent double non-taxation, as well as cases of no or low taxation associated with practices that artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that generate it» [4]. The problems are primarily related to such «practices that artificially segregate taxable income from the activities that generate it» and not related to any segregation of business profits caused by the business or technological development as such.

It is not a mere chance that Action Plan 1 of the 15 Actions within the BEPS project is devoted to the Digital Economy. It states that «BEPS is a concern in the context of the digital economy» [5].

3. The Digital Economy

3.1. BEPS issues

The BEPS Action Plan 1 addresses a number of tax challenges of the digi­tal economy [6]. My concentration lies on three issues. The first one relates to the statement that there should exist an «ability of a company to have a significant digital presence in the economy of another country without being lia­ble to taxation due to the lack of nexus under current international rules». The second field for my analysis is that there might exist a specific problem related to «the attribution of value created from the generation of marketable location-relevant data through the use of digital products and services». The reason for my selection is that these two matters have caused national initiatives as well as tax studies and articles in journals. The third one is the pro­blem to ensure an effective tax collection.

3.2. Characteristics of the Digital Economy

The whole economy is becoming digital. The effects of new General Pur­pose Technologies (GPT) in the fields of information and communication have «implications beyond the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, impacting all sectors of the economy and society: retail, tran­sport, financial services, manufacturing, education, healthcare, media etc.» [7].

There is no special division of the economy that may be named digital. The Economy is Digital. Every sector within European business is or will be digital, at least to a certain extent. Digitalisation relates to manufacturing in­dustries as well as to IT and other service activities. The ongoing development underlines the impossibility to establish a firm borderline between the digital world and other fields. It is possible to characterize the Digital Eco­nomy through a set of key features like mobility, network effects and use of data, but not to define what constitutes the digital economy. It includes e-commerce suppliers and developers of apps to mobiles or other devices as well as suppliers of goods, like cars, trucks and refrigerators, with embedded software.

OECD underlines that it is «difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for tax purposes» [8]. The conclusion by the EU Report is simply that there should be No special taxation of the Digital Economy and No special fiscal provisions for digital businesses. There should be no form of ring-fencing around the Digital Economy.

This is valid for Corporate Income taxation as well as Consumption taxation. The Report underlines in its Executive summary that «there should not be a special tax regime for digital companies. Rather the general rules should be applied or adapted so that “digital” companies are treated in the same way as others» [9].

4. National attempts to introduce special taxation on the Digital Economy

4.1. France and Italy

In spite of the impossibility to define a Digital sector with a sharp borderline to other business activities France and Italy have proposed and to a certain degree legislated but later on withdrawn their attempts to introduce laws on general or specific digital taxation. In spite of its underlining that «the digital economy is everywhere» a French Ministerial Report [10] proposed that France should «create a tax on the use of data obtained through regular and systematic monitoring of users’ activity in the country. Collecting data obtained through regular and systematic monitoring of users is the only taxable event that ensures the neutrality of the tax with regard to business mo­dels, technologies and business location strategies» [11]. In my view it is a very remarkable statement. Such a tax is in my opinion not neutral in respect of the country and context where the service is offered. Besides, it does notcon­sider the fast technological development of hardware and software.

The Italian attempts to tax advertising services and sponsored links within the frames of the VAT system have failed [12]-[13]. In principle I have the same main objections on the Italian law as on the French one.

4.2. United Kingdom

The United Kingdom introduced as from 1 April 2015 a Diverted Profits Tax at a rate of 25 % «to target multinationals that avoid paying tax on profits from UK activity by shifting them to countries where they’ll go untaxed» [14]. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury David Gauke added that «[m]ulti­national digital businesses should pay the tax that is due, just like everybody else». The tax will not be applicable to SMEs.

The vocabulary of the Diverted Profits Tax Law is rather specific. Under the heading Avoidance of a UK taxable presence it states that a person «is carrying on activity in the United Kingdom in connection with supplies of goods or services made by the foreign company to customers in the United Kingdom». It is also remarkable that the United Kingdom acts parallel to the BEPS project together with the tax authorities in five other countries under the name E6. The purpose is «to share information about how digital multi­nationals might be shifting their profits to tax havens» [15]. Like other attempts to tax the digital economy it has been called “Google tax” [16].

Compared with the French and Italian legislative attempts, the UK complex Diverted Profits Tax is at the same time wider and more limited. It targets businesses of all kinds, but only multinational ones. The Government re­presentatives have argued that the tax should affect digital businesses, but the tax is according to the wording directed towards companies avoiding a UK presence.

5. Corporation Tax Policy Options

5.1. Conclusions by the EU Expert Group

In the Expert Group we have taken «the view that there should not be a special tax regime for digital companies. Rather the general rules should be applied or adapted so that “digital” companies are treated in the same way as others. These general rules must impose taxation based on real economic activities ...» [17].

In my view the critical moment of the Report in respect of Corporate Income Taxation is related to the Long term policy options. The text refers to «more radical changes to the corporation tax system [which] have been pro­posed in academic literature. Some of these focus on a “destination based” corporation tax. This would be similar to a VAT in that its key feature would be that exports would be zero-rated and imports would be taxed. It would differ from a VAT in that wage costs would continue to be deductible, and the tax would continue to be levied on an accounting basis, rather than using the invoice-credit method. It has been claimed that a version of such a destination-based corporation tax based on cash flow (with immediate expensing of capital expenditure but no relief for interest payments, and therefore even more similar to VAT) would be neutral with respect to corporate location, investment, financing and transfer pricing decisions, thus addressing some fundamental concerns of international tax competition between countries» [18]. The report adds that «[t]hese conclusions are not uncontested» and says in a footnote that «[c]areful consideration of international redi­stribution of tax revenues would be necessary. Moreover, possible empirically significant effects on resource allocation, including trade and cross-border investment would have to be considered».

A corporate tax on cash flows instead of on profit determined on an accrual basis would fundamentally change the current tax system and allocate the tax base to destination countries instead of source countries. This would require a thorough analysis of the economic effects and specific design in order to find a common alignment for such a new definition and allocation of the tax base and tax revenue among countries. I have underlined that the entire revenue from VAT already accrues to the place of consumption. To add corporate income tax, wholly or partly, to those markets would raise ma­jor concerns, since it would entail a substantial redistribution of revenue bet­ween Member States and a risk for a radical restructuring of cross-border business investments. Despite ongoing research on how such a tax would be implemented, much more information would have to be gathered before a policy line could be agreed.

As said in the Report the long term conclusions are not uncontested. In my view the statement that such a destination based corporate income tax «would be neutral with respect to corporate location, investment, financing and transfer pricing decisions» is simply not true. It is misleading. Only if we for a second forget about the EU, business realities, present localization of investments etc., there would be no distortions. However, the conclusions are true only under very specific conditions presented in certain academic mo­dels.

It has been argued that a cash flow tax on a destination basis «would not create distortions to any margins of business decisions, namely choice between discrete options, choice of scale of investment, choice of form of income, and choice of source of finance» [19]. I have no objection, as long as the conclusions are not wider than so. A destination based Corporate Income Tax has been explored in detail in another presentation [20]. The argument is «that the destination based tax does not create distortions to any margins of decision (at least in the model), but falls on residents of the destination country» [21]. With those restrictions to the said model I have no objection. However, for public decision-making it is necessary to precisely define the concepts – all the concepts and their consequences! When the Report states that destination based corporate income tax «would be neutral with respect to corporate location, investment, financing and transfer pricing decisions», it leaves the firm ground. If the present source based tax will be destination based, the state revenue will also be transferred from one country to another one. For the enterprise it may mean a necessity to change its localization of its future investments from one country to another in order to qualify for a full deduction of wages and other business costs.

In my view the arguments for a destination based corporate income tax depart from the task of the Expert Group, as it does not mean any solution of the problems articulated by the G20-countries and the OECD named BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting). «[W]hat creates tax policy concerns is that, due to gaps in the interaction of different tax systems, and in some cases because of the application of bilateral tax treaties, income from cross-border activities may go untaxed anywhere, or be only unduly lowly taxed» [22]. Instead the Expert Group proposal in this respect would only lead to a giant shift of revenue between states with loyal and well operating fiscal systems. Losers would be small countries and countries with a strong export business, independently if it relates to traditional export of goods from e.g. manufacturing industry or the export of services in the form of apps or e-commerce of other kinds. Minor markets with a strong export sector would be loosers. Winners would be big markets and states with a small export business.

Such a destination based corporate income tax should not only hurt state revenue for a great number of countries but also the future for the enterprises concerned, as it should lead to a preference for future investments in countries with big markets in respect of the goods or services supplied by the enterprises. To argue that such a destination based corporate income tax «would be neutral with respect to corporate location, investment, financing and transfer pricing decisions» is misleading.

In my view also the future corporate income tax should be based on the sites and places where the Head Quarter and the permanent establishments are located, where the real business activities are carried out, where research is done and the place(s) to which the risks may be allocated. Some minimum form of physical presence and permanence must be required in any source country aspiring to fiscal benefits.

5.2. Time for a digital nexus?

5.2.1. Background

The digital development enables marketing and a number of service facilities to be carried out at a distance from the market. The definition of the traditional PE concept as well as the allocation and attribution of profits have been questioned.

5.2.2. Activities that are considered preparatory or auxiliary and hence benefit from the exceptions to the definition of PE

It has been argued that preparatory or auxiliary activities benefiting from the exceptions to the treaty definition of PE may be increasingly significant components of businesses in the digital economy [23]. «The envisaged amend­ments to the current PE definition, however, would only affect certain e-com­merce enterprises as part of the digital economy, but would not otherwise affect enterprises that do not sell any physical goods» [24].

5.2.3. Artificial decision-making

OECD states that «certain functions, including decision-making capabi­lities, can now be carried out by increasingly sophisticated software program­mes and algorithms. For example, contracts can in some cases be automatically accepted by software programmes, so that no intervention of local staff is necessary» [25]. In my mind there is always a qualified decision-maker behind each decision. The management decisions and the qualified programmes are previously done at the Head office or somewhere else. Decisions are always an outflow of human beings.

5.2.4. Significant digital presence

5.2.4.1. OECD Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy [26]

A significant digital presence would exist in connection with digital supplies, when one or more of the following conditions are met [27]. Digital pre­sence could be deemed to exist in a country when for example.

– A significant number of contracts for the provision of digital goods or services are remotely signed between the supplier and its customer resident in the country.

– Digital goods or services of the enterprise are widely used or consumed in the country.

– Substantial payments are made from customers in the country to the supplier in connection with contractual obligations arising from the provision of digital goods or services as part of the enterprise’s core business.

These examples illustrate the arbitrary requisites needed, whenever the firm, since long accepted, definition of a PE has been abolished. The OECD discloses the challenges. It addresses supplies based on «increased reliance on data and users participation in the digital economy, particularly where users provide personal data that can then be used to attract revenue from other users through multi-sided business models» [28]. It means that using data related to certain supplies would govern the corporate taxation related to other customers.

Still more the OECD develops the criteria related to a significant pre­sence test. One example is the very vague test on the relationships between the supplier and its customers extending over six months, combined with some form of physical presence in the country. My immediate reaction is to question-mark the wording related to the vague expression of a business relationship during not less than six months. The compliance burden for the tax officers and not least the taxable person would be big. Besides, there will be an enormous legal uncertainty for the latter. One example mentioned by OECD is the existence of website in the local language. My first remark is that a website may be stored at a server based in any country and does not represent a permanent place of business in any meaning. Secondly, distinctions based on the language used do not correspond to the requirement for neutrality.

5.2.4.2. Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of the Digital Economy [29]

The focus of the paper is «the development of a new potential PE nexus based on the digital economy» [30]. Based on theoretical analysis the authors suggest the establishing of a new PE nexus based on digital presence. The new nexus should consist of the four elements digital services, user threshold, a certain time threshold and a de minimis revenue threshold. A core argument is the allocation of income to the digital nexus. Based on the existing OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines the profit split method should be used combined with an upfront allocation of one third of the profit. It is not clear to which entity within a group the profits belong. It is an interesting, although not convincing, attempt to find a digital nexus. One basic mistake is to assume that digital transactions in general are abusive. The authors underline that «dealing with a new nexus based on digital presence, it is by far not only a question of countering BEPS, but also about a new allocation of taxing rights in general». The new PE nexus and its application might in itself lead to new options for erosion of the tax bases.

One essential mistake behind the suggested digital nexus and the proposed thresholds is the assumption that it should be possible to make a distinction between digital and other supplies. The authors are ring-fencing the digital economy and at the same time building new fences within companies. One important business and technological development during the last years has been the software embedded in physical goods like cars, trucks and refrigerators.

The authors «believe that a modern dimension of the sourcing theory could be invoked in order to justify the exercise of the taxing jurisdiction by the market country in respect of such business income» [31]. This motivation is very vague. What is modern? Is it an expression of a general business and technological standpoint in 2015?

Perhaps it is time to question the traditional border line between taxation of income and consumption. The theoretical connection between the two is clear. That the greater part of consumption takes place in the country of destination is obvious. Hence such taxation in that country better reflects the benefit theory then an arbitrary portion of the profits for non-resident suppliers.

5.3. The attribution of value created from the generation of data

«The expanding role of data raises questions about whether current nexus rules continue to be appropriate or whether any profits attributable to the remote gathering of data by an enterprise should be taxable in the State from which the data is gathered ...» [32]. The issues of how to attribute value created from the generation of data through digital products and services have been raised many times during the BEPS-project. The EU Report is clear. It states that «the Group believes that there is no convincing argument why the collection of data via electronic means in a country should in itself create a taxable presence in that country». The background for certain national attempts to tax such activities is that several enterprises «have been extremely successful in rapidly generating significant revenues from the collection, processing and marketing of free individual data». If such activities will be successful in a business perspective, they will result in taxable profits. If we are not respecting the basis of a market economy, the fiscal burden would be completely arbitrary and an obstacle to business development.

5.4. Time for Withholding taxes?

The creation of a withholding tax on digital transactions has been an option discussed [33]. In connection with cross-border taxation of the digital eco­nomy, it is basically meaningful only as a complement to some form of sour­ce taxation based on what has been called a significant digital presence. It has been argued that «simply attributing profits to a non-physical PE and the opposition of the OECD to formulary taxation ... may require a remedial tool, such as a withholding tax to adequately implement the nexus-based approach in the digital economy» [34].

The authors of the paper mentioned supra propose a 10 % final withhold­ing tax on all base-eroding payments to non-residents, with exemptions basi­cally to payees registered to be taxed under a net taxation scheme. They want to apply a higher rate (15 %) for payments to accounts in or owned by low- or no-tax jurisdictions. My main objections are primarily that they are ring-fencing the digital economy and secondly that they seem to consider all payments for supplies of digital services as base-eroding. They are prepared to make exemptions for «payments for inputs beyond the digital economy». They argue expressively that «the heart of the proposal made by [their] position paper [is] the imposition of a withholding tax on digital transactions».

The wording might be confusing. If digital presence would be accepted as a source for taxation, it corresponds to what I supra has characterized as a destination based taxation. Such a gross income tax based on the turnover corresponds broadly to a destination based consumption tax.

If the PE threshold is in line with the existing rules under the OECD Mo­del Tax Convention, the need for an extraordinary measure like withholding would possibly be limited to certain royalty or other payments, which are considered as abusive.

The intervention by intermediaries such as banks and other financial institutions has been considered as an alternative form for withholding taxation. Even if payments from individuals would be exempted, I consider with­holding taxes as a serious step back in history. In a digital world the Ottawa Framework Conditions must apply. It means respect for principles of neutra­lity, efficiency, certainty, simplicity, effectiveness, fairness and flexibility [35].

I do not only have the objections on withholding taxes presented supra. Besides, such a tax as presented by the referred proposal is not a corporate tax based on profits, it is a destination based tax on the turnover in each country concerned. The authors argue that a final 10 % withholding tax is a relatively low rate [36]. Compared with the profits for a certain supplier of digital services such a tax might be enormous. It might be a hinder for entrance to a market, too. Even the authors admit that start-ups, companies in transition, loss-making and low-margin companies may view a “significant burden”. For these companies the tax would mean a pure cost (and a cash strap) that further encumbers them and makes it difficult for them to succeed.

6. Conclusions

The business and technological digital development is broad and fast. This underlines a need for OECD and EU initiatives related to a number of obstacles outlined in this paper. There is an obvious risk for erosion of the mutually accepted principles of international taxation [37]. The OECD in its report “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy” as well as the EU High Level Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy in its report “Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy”, both from 2014, have underlined that there should be no form of ring-fencing around the digital economy. Nevertheless, draft reports from OECD as well as other authors argue for different form of income taxation based on separation of digital activities from physical.

I have two main remarks on the future development of international taxa­tion. The first one is to return to the basic intentions with the BEPS project. The efforts should concentrate on strict applications of remedies against base eroding transactions within the digital as well as the physical world. My se­cond remark is that solutions must include both income and consumption taxation. Then the final marketplace will get its portion of the cake without arbitrary changes of accepted norms for international taxation.

Note

[1] È stato componente del gruppo di esperti nominato dalla Commissione europea sulla Tassazione della digital economy.

[2] Contributo non sottoposto a referaggio.

Il presente contributo è già stato pubblicato in: AA.VV., La digital economy nel sistema tributario italiano ed europeo, a cura di Del Federico-Ricci, Padova, 2015, pp. 13-28.

[3] See the EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO/13/1042, Taxing the Digital Economy: The Commission has appointed the members of the expert group, Brussels, 25 November 2013. The group was chaired by Vítor Gaspar, former finance minister of Portugal. Bjorn West­berg was one of the six experts from across Europe. See also the Report “Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy”, 28 May 2014, in http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_ customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/good_governance_matters/digital/ report_digital_economy.pdf (accessed 30.3.2015). Any reference in this article to the “Re­port” refers to this document.

[4] OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, in http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 9789264202719-en, 2013, p. 13.

[5] OECD, Action Plan, cit., p. 14.

[6] OECD, Action Plan, cit., pp. 14-15.

[7] See the Report, p. 11.

[8] See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, OECD/G20, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, in http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264218789-en, 2014, p. 157.

[9] See the Report, p. 5; see also p. 47.

[10] See Task Force on Taxation of the Digital Economy, Ministère de L’economie et des Finances and Ministère du Redressement Productif, France, January 2013. In spite of the fact that it is a public report it is often quoted as Pierre Collin & Nicolas Colin, the names of the rapporteurs.

[11] See the French Report mentioned supra p. 4.

[12] See e.g. QUARATINO, New Provisions Regarding the Taxation of the Digital Economy, in 54 Eur. Taxn., n. 5, 2014, Journals IBFD, pp. 211-217; see also TRENTA, The Italian Google Tax. National taxation and the European e-Economy, in Riv. trim. dir. trib., issue 4, 2014.

[13] The Italian provisions have been partially repealed by the Law No. 68 of 2 May 2014 (the Official Gazette No. 102 of 5 May 2014).

[14] See the document Diverted profits tax, part of Finance Bill, 2015, HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs, 10 December 2014; see also Diverted Profits Tax. Interim Draft Guidance, updated 30 March 2015; press release Government ramps up efforts to tackle digital multinational tax risks, in HM Revenue & Customs and David Gauke, 25 March 2015.

[15] See the press release Government ramps up efforts to tackle digital multinational tax risks, in HM Revenue & Customs and David Gauke, 25 March 2015.

[16] See e.g. UK joins international crackdown on digital tax avoiders, in Financial Times, 25 March 2015; US multinationals fight UK chancellor George Osborne’s Google tax, in Financial Times, 9 February 2015.

[17] See the Report, p. 41.

[18] See the Report, p. 50.

[19] See DEVEREUX-DE LA FERIA, Designing and implementing a Destination Based Corporate Tax, April 2014, p. 8.

[20] See AUERBACH-DEVEREUX, Consumption and Cash-flow Taxes in an International Setting, National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, MA, USA, October 2013.

[21] See DEVEREUX, Issues in the Design of Taxes on Corporate Profit, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, WP 12/15, April 2012.

[22] See OECD, Action Plan, cit., p. 10.

[23] See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, cit., p. 129.

[24] See HONGLER-PISTONE, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of the Digital Economy, in IBFD, White Paper, 20 January 2015, Executive Summary, para. 2.

[25] See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, cit., p. 127.

[26] See OECD/G20, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, OECD, 2014.

[27] See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, cit., pp. 145-146.

[28] Ibidem.

[29] See HONGLER-PISTONE, op. cit.

[30] See HONGLER-PISTONE, op. cit., p. 13; see also the Executive Summary, para 3 and 4.

[31] See HONGLER-PISTONE, op. cit., p. 13; see also pp. 18 and 19.

[32] See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, cit., p. 130.

[33] See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, cit., p. 146.

[34] See BAEZ-BRAUNER, Withholding Taxes in the Service of BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, in IBFD, 2 February 2015, pp. 6 and 7.

[35] See OECD, Electronic Commerce Taxation Framework Conditions – Report by the Com­mittee on Fiscal Affairs, 1998; see also OECD, Taxation and Electronic Commerce. Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions, 2001, p. 230; WESTBERG, Cross-Border Taxation of E-commerce, in IBFD, Amsterdam, 2002, p. 41.

[36] See BAEZ-BRAUNER, op. cit., pp. 21 and 22.

[37] See e.g. WESTBERG, op. cit., pp. 113-115.